COMMENTS
SALES OF CORPORATE CONTROL AND
THE THEORY OF OVERKILL
People ought to look into the history of medicine a little....
I asked a doctor and student of medical history when doctors
began to cure more people than they killed. He said they might
reach that in another generation.'
In the controversial area of corporate conflicts of interest, the problem
of whether a holder of controlling corporate shares may dispose of them
at a premium has evoked more than its share of attention. Some commentators have prophesied a rule of liability of the seller for that portion
of the premium allocable to the remaining shares in all cases.2 Considering the present paucity of data on possible detrimental effects of sales of
control at a premium, it is the thesis of this comment that it would be
economically unsound to impose liability for the premium in every case
involving a sale of controlling shares. Similarly, where the premium is
received in a recapitalization, there is economic justification for not imposing liability for the premium. Conceptually, the position of the owner
of share control is a difficult one. In conflict with the supposed unfettered
freedom to dispose of his holdings based on "habits of thought in a
purchase and sale economy," 3 is the notion that minimal duties of
fairness are owed to the non-controlling shareholders by those in control,
4
as fiduciaries.
Earlier, the courts imposed liability on the seller for the premium
1 Knight, Some Comments on the Assumptions Underlying the Conflict-of-Interest
Concept, in CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST 97-98 (U. Chi. Law School Conference Series No. 17, 1961).
_ 2 Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1220 (1958) ("slowly
emerging rule (by no means universally acknowledged)'). See also GowER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 494 (2d ed. 1957) ('the American courts are beginning
to come round to the view'); LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 268 (1959); cf. Leech, Transactions
in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 839 (1956). Surprisingly, Professor Jennings,
a forceful advocate of a rule imposing liability in all cases, has declined to predict the
outcome. Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 (1956).
3 VEBLEN, THE THEORY oF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 77 (1923); Levy v. American Beverage
Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 523 (1942) ("lawful property right').
4 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (subordination of claims in bankruptcy); cf.
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (subordination of claims in
a § 77(B) reorganization).
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when the transaction could be characterized as a "corporate transaction"
or a "sale of office." 5 At present, however, two views which lead to the
imposition of liability in all cases are the focal point of repeated
attention. The first, that of Professor Berle, argues from corporate
democracy and the putative equality of all shareholders. 6 Since control
entails the power to dispose of assets of all the shareholders, the premium
can be attributed to the sale of control and should be allotted to all
7
shareholders ratably.
The second argument for the imposition of liability in all cases stems
not from the power of control, but from:
concern over the motives of the purchaser and the type of
transactions likely to follow the transfer of control. Professor
Jenningss suggests that in the usual case the purchaser's willingness to pay a premium springs from an expectation of returns
which will not be shared with all shareholders, returns following
from private exploitation of "corporate patronage or other nonbalance sheet assets or from diversion of profits in reorganization
or liquidation." 9
5 E.g., BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 591-97 (3d ed. 1959). A third category
is "misrepresentation." But the situations in which controlling shareholders mislead
others into selling at a lower price than that received for control, though numerous,
are not within the scope of this comment. See cases collected at Annot. 50 A.L.R.2d
1146 (1956); BARER & CARY, op. cit. supra at 595-97; 15 Fx.rcHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5845 (rev. ed. 1961).
6 BERIE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 243-44 (1932),
was the first exposition of this theory.
7 GowER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 494: "This seems eminently desirable . . . all
members should share ratably in this, not just the lucky few. But this would be a
highly novel doctrine in England." See also Shcrt v. Treasury Commissioners, [1948]
A.C. 534, 546 (dictum); cf. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945). In Young, the defendants, preferred shareholders, objected to confirmation of a plan of reorganization
on the grounds that participation of the junior creditors was excessive and should be
subordinated to the preferred. Pending the defendants' appeal, they sold their shares
to directors of the corporation who were junior creditors and the appeal was voluntarily dismissed. The court held the defendants liable for the premium on the sale
for the benefit of all preferred shareholders.
8 Jennings, supra note 2, at 14-19.
9 Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHICAGO B.A. RcoRD 376, 379 (1957).

See also 1 HORNSTEIN,

CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 366, at 479-80 (1959). A third

view would impose liability for the premium as a means of preventing the controlling
shares of a close corporation from being transferred in opposition to the "reasonable
expectations" of other shareholders who expect to participate in the management as
if it were a partnership. Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Premium: An
Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 DuKE L.J. 554, 561-64. This view, while novel,
necessarily presumes that a significant degree of co-variation exists between sales of
control, receipt of a premium and inequities in close corporations. Professors Jennings
and Hornstein to the contrary notwithstanding, even a co-variation between sales of
control and receipt of a premium has yet to be proven. Hill, The Sale of Controlling
Shares, 70 HARv. L. REV. 986, 1038-39 n.150 (1957). Furthermore, in the case of the
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This view of Professor Jennings is subject to the criticism that removing the premium would block an unknown number of beneficial sales
of control, 10 thus depriving the corporation of a more efficient, rather
than merely a more optimistic, management. Conceding Professor Jennings' asumption that some purchasers are willing to pay a premium to
obtain benefits at the expense of remaining shareholders, there is no
empirical evidence to justify his casual assumption that most purchasers
of share control are actuated by such improper motives. Furthermore, the
casual assumption is contrary to the economic hypothesis about the
functioning of a free market for capital. For the optimal allocation of
resources, "all that matters is whether the distribution of funds contributes to efficiency, and there is every reason to suppose that, broadly
speaking, it does. Those firms which use funds profitably find it easy to
get more; those which do not, find it difficult." 1 There is no reason why
this hypothesis is not equally applicable to purchasers of controlling
shares.12
Professor Berle's conclusion of liability in all cases is similarly rebuttable on the ground that an unknown number of beneficial sales
resulting in more efficient management would be blocked. It is no answer
to this economic argument merely to say that a "high-minded" purchaser
close corporation there exists no simple rule of thumb, such as market value, to determine whether a premium exists. On the difficulty of valuing shares in a close corporation, see generally Rice, The Valuation of Close Held Stocks: A Lottery in Federal
Taxation, 98 U. PA. L. Rxv. 367 (1950). The author of the third view does well to
suggest that the primary protection of a shareholder in a close corporation is proper
draftsmanship.
10 Hill, supra note 9, at 1039; Katz, supra note 9, at 379-80; Comment, supra note 9,
at 565; Comment, Sale of Corporate Control, 19 U. CH. L. RFv. 869, 870-72 (1952);
Note, The Sale of Corporate Control: The Berle Theory and the Law, 25 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 59, 71 (1963); Note, Restrictions on the Transfer of Controlling Shares, 40 VA. L.
REv. 195, 208 (1954); cf. Company Law Committee, Report, CM9. No. 1749, at 98 (1962):
"There appears to be general agreement that take-overs, mergers and amalgamations
of companies ... are an essential feature of economic growth and development." See
also Note, Corporations: Liability for Sale of Controlling Stock: Perlman v. Feldmann,
40 CORNELL L.Q. 786, 794 (1955), which opposed the proposed rule of liability for the
premium in all cases on the ground that "this result is repugnant to present day
concepts of stock transferability ...." It is fair to assume that the alienability argument subsumes the argument from economics.
11 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & EcoNoTMICs 1, 19
(1959) (advocating an auction of radio and television frequencies by the Government
to the highest bidder).
12 The validity of the economic argument is limited to cases of share "control," as
defined in text accompanying notes 103-13 infra. The economic rationale could otherwise
justify retention of a large premium for even infinitesimally small blocks of stock sold
by directors. In those cases the risk that the purchaser is actuated by improper motives
is disproportionately large.
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is paying the right amount to the wrong person,13 and that all shareholders are entitled to the premium.
Applying the hypothesis of the market, it can be seen that rather than
being a depressant on the rights of remaining shareholders, sales of
corporate control at a premium will presumably benefit the remaining
shareholders.' 4 This is not to say, however, that a rejection of the
alternatives posited by Professors Berle and Jennings necessitates a
complete absence of liability. Prevention of the economic dislocations
resulting from a broad rule of liability does not of itself require exculpating sellers in circumstances where there is actual harm to remaining
shareholders. This comment will be concerned with development of a
rationale for the imposition of liability and with the measure of damages
in cases both of sales of corporate control and recapitalizations. 15
I.

SALES OF CONTROL

The courts have thus far uniformly rejected any rule that would impose liability for the premium on the seller in all cases. 16 Until 1962,
however, a rationale was noticeably lacking. In that year the Second
Circuit decided Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,' 7 which served to synthesize the divergent theories of liability.
Essex was an action against the president and chairman of the board of
Republic Pictures Corporation, for damages for his refusal to carry out
an agreement to sell to the plaintiff 28.3 per cent of the common stock
outstanding. The contract price of eight dollars per share was roughly
two dollars above quotations on the New York Stock Exchange at the date
13 Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22, 64-65 (1963).
14 See generally Hill, supra note 9, for a compendium and exegesis of the possibilities

of benefit.
15 It might be argued that the best solution to the problem of purchasers actuated
by improper motives is not the imposition of liability on the seller, but rather, the
possibility of more careful judicial attention to the abuses of the purchasers. To the
extent that judicial scrutiny of day-to-day management can only be cursory, this solution is impractical. See text accompanying notes 80, 118-19 infra.
16 See, e.g., Pelman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955); Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38
N.Y.S.2d 517, 523 (1942); Schwamm v. Alpert, 31 Misc. 2d 768, 769, 221 N.Y.S.2d 917,
919 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("The mere sale of a controlling stock interest by those who own
same gives rise to no duty -upon the majority to secure a sale at the same price for
all, even though the sellers hold a managerial office in the corporation. . . ."); cf.
Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962) (recapitalization);
Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741, 751 (Del. Ch. 1960). But see Sobieski, Securities
Regulation in California:Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A.L. R.v. 1, 19 (1963) (relating California Corporation Commissioners' requirement of an equal offer to all shareholders by the purchaser of a controlling interest).
17 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962), noted in 4 BoSrON COLLEGE INDUSTRiAL & COMMERCIAL
L REv. 421 (1963); 76 HARv. L. REv. 834 (1963); 37 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 933 (1963).

2
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of the contract. The plaintiff contended that the value of the shares on
the date set for closing was in excess of $12.75 each. Yates, the defendant,
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the contract was in
contravention of public policy and unenforceable by either party because
it provided for immediate transfer of control of the board of directors
by the process of seriatim resignations.'3 Stating that "directorships are
fiduciary positions and are not subject to barter and sale,"' 9 the trial
judge granted the defendant's motion.
The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that a provision for
seriatim resignation did not make the contract illegal per se under New
York law. Of greater significance to sellers of corporate' control was the
proposed doctrine of liability for the premium enunciated by Chief
Judge Lumbard.
20
A fair generalization from these cases [Gerdes v. Reynolds,
2
21
Porter v. Healy, and Perlman v. Feldmann ] may be that a
holder of corporate control will not, as a fiduciary, be permitted
to profit from facilitating actions on the part of the purchasers
of control which are detrimental to the interests of the corporation or the remaining shareholders. There is, however, no
suggestion that the transfer of control over Republic to Essex
carried any such threat to the interests of the corporation or its
23
other shareholders.
The text of Essex thus revolved about the foreseeability of detriment to
18 See text accompanying notes 90-113 infra. Actually the contract only gave the
purchaser an option to demand seriatim resignations, but the option had been exercised. Joint Appendix, p. 4a, Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
The existence of an option was not important on appeal because the court held that
it was not severable from the balance of the contract. 305 F.2d at 574-75 (Lumbard,
C.J.).
19 Opinion of Dimock, J., Joint Appendix, pp. 3a, 6a, Essex Universal Corp. v.
Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) ("The rule has repeatedly been applied to contracts
like the present one . . . ."). See also text accompanying notes 90-113 infra.

20 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
21 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914).
22 219 F.2d 173 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). Noted in 40 CORNELL L.Q.
786 (1955); 68 HARV. L. REv. 1274 (1955); 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 895 (1955).
23 305 F.2d at 576. The decision does not, however, lend itself to such easy characterization, because each judge wrote a separate opinion. Judge Clark, the author of
Perlman, seemingly concurred in the treatment of Perlman by the Chief Judge, id. at
580 n. *. Judge Friendly did not discuss the detrimental sales issue.
The synthesis in the Essex opinion is not completely novel. The clearest exponent
of a rule of foreseeable detriment was Hill, supra note 9. Other suggestions of such
a foundation are found in Jennings, supra note 2, at 31 ("When we compare
the underlying bases of the 'rule of office' and 'corporate transaction' cases, we find
a single controlling principle, the abuse of power by the possessor of 'control.' "); 1
HomsmSeIN, CORPORATION LAw & PRAcrc § 366, at 481 (1959). See also Comment, 22
U. CHL L. REV. 895, 901-02 (1955).
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the corporation and to remaining shareholders. In articulating definitions, care must be taken to avoid expansive interpretations which are in
practical effect rules of absolute liability.24 One need only define detri-

ment to be the premium paid for the power wielded on behalf of all
shareholders to come full circle to the view of Professor Berle.
A. Detriment and Foreseeability
The dearest example of detriment is found in the so-called "looting
cases," in which the sellers of control have been subjected to liability
because they sold to purchasers who looted the corporation, 25 or used the
26
corporate assets to pay the purchase price.

In

Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,2 7 an investment

company sued the sellers of controlling shares (27%) and the former
directors to recover damages sustained as a result of subsequent looting
by the purchasers. Most of the assets of the looted company were
securities. The court allowed recovery because:
[T]he circumstances were such as to indicate to any reasonable
person ... that there was more than a possibility of fraud and
consequent injury to the corporation ....
That being so, there

plainly was a duty upon the sellers to make a genuine effort to
obtain and verify such information .
28
making the sale.

.

. or ...

to refrain from

24 See especially the discussion of possible interpretations of the Perlman decision
at text accompanying notes 32-47 infra.
25 Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northem Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), noted in Note, Duties of Controlling
Shareholders in Transferring Their Shares, 54 HARv. L. Rav. 648 (1941); Note, Sale
of ControllingMinority Interest Under Questionable Circumstances, 8 U. Cm. L. REy.
335 (1941); cf. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901). But cf. Francis v.
Medill, 16 Del. Ch. 129, 141 Ad. 697 (1928).
26 Dale v. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948); cf. Field v. Western
Life Indem. Co., 166 Fed. 607 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1908), aff'd sub nom. Moulton v. Field, 179
Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910).
27 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
28 Id. at 27. (Emphasis added.) This reasoning has been criticized for imposing a
broad duty of investigation unsupported by the case law. Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 786,
793 (1955). Such a duty under circumstances indicating a possibility of looting does,
however, comport with rough notions of fair play. Note, 54 HARv. L. Rav. 648, 654
(1941); Note, 8 U. CHL L. REv. 335, 337 (1941) (implying a positive duty to investigate
the character and finances of the purchaser in all circumstances).
Another investment company case imposed not only liability for the premium,
as in Insuranshares,but also for the damages sustained by the corporation. Gerdes v.
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see text accompanying note 70 infra, on the
issue of damages. Although the opinion has been criticized as unclear, Leech, supra
note 2, at 786-89, the court did formulate a test of "risk reasonably to be perceived."
28 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
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That looting of all the assets of the corporation is detrimental to the
other shareholders is obvious; the sole issue in looting cases is foreseeability.

29

However, in the great majority of cases the detriment is not so dear,
and until Essex, there was no clearly articulated basis for liability.
Perlman v. Feldmann,30 the most controversial of the cases imposing
liability, was a derivative suit by a remaining shareholder to recover
from the selling shareholder the premium he received for selling his
thirty-seven per cent controlling interest in Newport Steel Company.3 1
At the time of the sale, steel was in short supply due to the exigencies
of the Korean War. Although steel companies generally considered it
improper to raise their prices, Newport did in effect raise its prices by
demanding interest-free loans from steel consumers. The defendant sold
his controlling interest and transferred control of the board to the Wilport Company by the process of seriatim resignation. Wilport was owned
by sixteen end-users of steel whose dominant motive, as the trial court
found, was to obtain a continuing source of steel supply. The trial
court denied recovery, holding that the power to control distribution of
the corporate product was "not a corporate asset but rather an attribute
inseparably attaching to the stock which, if it has any effect on value,
is an inseparable factor entering into the value of the control block."3 2
It was found that the value of the controlling shares was twenty dollars
each, and that the evidence did not show what the value of the stock
would be if shorn of its power to control.3 3 Whether Newport could have,
29 For a collection of facts deemed by the courts to indicate foreseeable detriment
in looting situations, see Leech, supra note 2, at 794-96. Some stress has been laid on
the fact that liquidity of the corporation's assets is a sine qua non of liability in the
looting cases. The distinction does not appear sound, although the courts have imposed
liability on the transferor of a non-liquid concern for subsequent looting only once.
Dale v. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948) (oil company); Berle, supra
note 2, at 1219. The distinction is only relevant to the ease of calculating actual
damages, since the value of liquid assets is by definition readily determinable. The
fact that the sale is to a rival of the corporation has not been considered determinative of liability. Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1931); cf. Phelan
v. Edison Elec. Ilium. Co., 24 Misc. 109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305, (Sup. Ct. 1898). Even so,
the court in Stanton looked at subsequent events to negate any inferences of wrongdoing
drawn from the fact of sale to a rival, and in Phelan the court marshaled much
evidence to rebut wrongdoing.
30 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 +1955).
31 A prior suit relied only on Rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949). The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the rule permits recovery only by persons
who have sold or purchased the stock themselves. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (A. Hand, J.); 3 Loss, SEculrn.S REGULATION 1469 (1961)
("basically correct.').
32 Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 182 (D. Conn. 1952).
33 Id. at 179.
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at the time of the sale, profitably engaged in borrowing from consumers
to further expand and integrate its facilities was not shown, the court
said, and implied that in any case, such a transaction might have been
unethical in the gray market that existed. 34
The Second Circuit reversed, assimilating the conduct of the defendant
to the appropriation of a corporate opportunity, 35 because the defendant
had failed to "negate completely any possibility of gain by Newport"3 6
from interest-free loans tied to sales. It remanded the case to determine
the value of the defendant's stock shorn of power to control the output,
stating that the burden of proof on that issue also rested on the
defendant. 37
The opinion may be read to betoken liability of the seller for the
premium in all cases. The court stated that a mere possibility of detriment suffices to impose liability on the seller,3 8 and imposed the burden
on the defendant-seller to negate completely any possibility of detriment.
Such a burden of proof would seem to be insurmountable for the seller.
From the fact situation, however, it is clear that a reasonable probability existed that the purchaser of control would sell the corporate
product at a lower price to itself than to outside purchasers, i.e., without
the necessity of making interest-free loans. The trial court found that
Wilport's motive in purchasing control was to acquire a continuing
source of steel, which would seem to exclude the possibility that the
purchase of control was effected simply as a good investment. Save for
economies resulting from vertical integration which were neither alleged
nor shown, the purchase of Newport would have resulted in no special
advantages to Wilport without wrongful self-dealing. Wilport could have
simply bought all the steel it needed at the market price. But if the
market was irrational, i.e., steel producers, because of the war effort,
charged prices less than those which would result in a maximization of
their profits, Wilport may not have gotten an adequate supply by offering
the price charged. The irrational market has been offered as one explanation of the premium.3 9 If the decision of the Circuit Court was based
on a presumption of an irrational market, the sale of control to Wilport
would not have entailed any harm to Newport. It would have received
34

Id. at 175.

35 Judge Swan, in dissent, thought that the majority had adopted the plaintiff's

theory that "control of product" was a corporate asset. 219 F.2d at 179.
36 219 F.2d at 177.
37 Id. at 178. The court sanctioned recovery by the shareholders directly, thus removing the obstacle of unjust enrichment of the purchaser.
38 Id. at 176-77.
39 Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE LJ.223, 225 (1962).
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the same price from Wilport that it would have received from any other
buyer. The crucial question then in Perlman is whether the free market
operated in the steel industry to properly allocate available supply. It
is difficult to presume such irrational conduct of steel producers. In fact,
the trial court found that Newport's method of raising prices by tying
sales to interest-free loans had been to some extent adopted by other
steel companies, 40 an indication of the proper functioning of the market.
Furthermore, prices could have been raised indirectly by curtailment of
services or a reduction in quality, avoiding charges of wartime profiteering, yet leaving "prices charged" constant.4 '
The interpretation of unfair dealing finds adequate support in the
language of the court in Perlman. By assimilating the sale of control at
a premium to the appropriation of a corporate opportunity the court
implied that the risk that the purchaser would cause the corporation
to engage in dealings less favorable than those at arms length was substantial. 42 Furthermore, the court stated:
We do not mean to suggest that a majority shareholder cannot
dispose of his controlling block without having to account to his
corporation for the profits or even never do this with impunity
when the buyer is an interested customer, actual or potential,
for the corporation's product. But when the sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate good will and
consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who caused the sacri43
fice, he should account for the gains.
Thus it is clear that the Second Circuit saw a risk of economic harm
to the corporation that was both foreseeable and substantial-the proper
44
touchstone of liability.

In Essex, Chief Judge Lumbard not only arrayed Perlman with the
looting cases, 45 but he also characterized the actions of the defendant
40 129 F. Supp. at 169, 175.
41 Even if the decision of the Second Circuit in Perlman was properly bottomed on

the existence of a reasonable foreseeability of detriment to remaining shareholders, the
result is still erroneous because of an absence of actual damages. See text accompanying
note 83 infra.
42 219 F.2d at 176-77.
43 Id. at 178. (Emphasis added.) See Note, The Sale of Corporate Control: The Berle
Theory and the Law, 25 U. Prrr. L. REv. 59, 69 (1963), which properly implies that
had the buyer been a producer of steel, rather than an end-user, the result would be
different because of the absence of foreseeable detriment.
44 Hill, supra note 9, at 990; Katz, supra note 9, at 378, 380; Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q.
786, 794 (1955); Comment, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 895, 900-01 (1955); cf. Honigman v.
Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 1962); Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d
741 (Del. Ch. 1960). But see Benson v. Braun, 141 N.Y.S.2d 286, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(semble), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1955).
45 305 F.2d at 576. See Note, The Sale of Corporate Control: The Berle Theory and
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Feldmann as the appropriation of a "corporate asset." 46 The language
is indicative of more than a mere possibility of detriment. He stated
that the rule of the arrayed cases was that a controlling shareholder is
liable for facilitating detriment to the remaining shareholders 47-a rule
inconsistent with the irrational market theory in Perlman. In the irrational market situation Wilport would pay the same price as other endusers of steel and no detriment would have resulted to Newport.
A further problem is the possibility of detriment where the purchaser
of control has first made an offer to purchase all or substantially all the
assets or outstanding shares of the corporation, but later purchases only
the controlling shares at a premium.
In Commonwealth Title Insurance & Trust Company v. Seltzer,48 a
corporation had its "whole capital" invested in a single parcel of realty,
which the purchaser wished to acquire. An agent of the purchaser
approached one defendant, a director, with an offer to purchase the
realty. This offer was rejected and the transaction was consummated by
the purchase of the controlling shares from the defendants. The real
estate was then sold to the purchaser by the corporation at a "price not
found to be inadequate." 49 The court required the defendants to pay
to the corporation the profits realized in purchasing stock to gain control
and then selling it. It characterized what transpired as a corporate transaction. 50 Although the case may be interpreted as'one bottomed on a
theory of possible misrepresentation to the shareholders who sold to the
defendants, 51 (in that recovery was measured by the profits made in dealthe Law, 25 U. PrrT. L. REV. 59, 69 (1963), which disputes the contention of Professor
Hill that Perlman was a logical extension of the looting cases. The author there would
characterize Perlman as the "wrongful appropriation of a corporate asset by the seller."
If the distinction is based on the supposition that only the seller is involved in
wrongdoing in Perlman, whereas in the looting cases the buyer is the wrongdoer, he
is rebutted by the implications from his hypothetical case based on Perlman, in which
the buyer was a producer rather than an end-user of steel. See note 43 supra.
46 305 F.2d at 576.
47 See text at note 23 supra.
48 227 Pa. 410, 76 At. 77 (1910).
49 Id. at 415, 76 Atl. at 78.
80 "[T]here is little or no doubt that the profits paid to the two defendants were
•.. part of the cost of the real estate .... The defendants knew this, and the facts
justify the inference that -the stock dealing was for the very purpose of diverting a part
of the price from the corporation into their own pockets ...." Id. at 417, 76 At. at 79.
But cf. Abelow v. Symonds, 184 A.2d 173 (Del. Ch. 1962). There plaintiff was a
minority shareholder of a subsidiary which sold its assets to the defendant parent
corporation. In response to the plaintiff's contention that he would have received
more by a merger or sale to a third party, the court denied relief, because an adequate
price had been received. Id. at 175, 176.
51 In two related cases, Seltzer and the corporate transaction doctrine were relied
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ing with the shares obtained from those shareholders) the result is more
consonant with an interpretation of liability for the premium. First,
recovery was had by the corporation rather than by the misled selling
shareholders. 52 Second, the defendant's profits resulted from amassing
53
control-no misrepresentation was shown.
Another case, Tryon v. Smith, 54 was an action by former minority
shareholders of a bank to recover their aliquot portion of the premium
received by the defendant from the sale of his seventy per cent interest
to Transamerica Corporation at $460.00 per share. Transamerica had
earlier approached the defendant, the president and a director of the
bank, with an offer to purchase all of the outstanding stock. He refused,
upon to avoid a decision on the question of whether an officer or director owed the
shareholders who sold to him a responsibility of disclosure. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d
68 (10th Cir. 1937); Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934).
52 "Although the proceeding was in form derivative, since the corposation had distributed most of its assets and apparently had only a formal existence, the court gave
a personal recovery rather than indulging in the more expensive remedy of appointing
a receiver." Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 23 (1956).
Professor Jennings views this relief as the precursor of the individual recovery which
was granted in Perlman to avoid the problem of unjust enrichment of the purchaser.
219 F.2d at 178.
53 While it is true that the defendant-directors in Seltzer did not resign in favor
of the purchaser, this fact should be inconsequential to the result. Professor Leech
suggests that the court might have had trouble with the. problem of establishing a
fiduciary duty had the defendants resigned, and points to the fact that the lower
court was unsure of what would happen in such a situation. Leech, Transactions in
Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 778 & n.147 (1956).
In a similar case, Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (Ct. Err. & App.
1920), the purchaser of controlling shares sought to acquire an asset of the corporation,
namely a contract to furnish telephone service to an army base. Defendant, the president, held 25% of the stock. The defendant acquired an additional 70% of the outstanding stock, and then sold the 95% to the purchaser at a premium. In a derivative
suit, the court denied recovery to the plaintiff, a remaining shareholder, because the
money was paid to defendant "for his services in acquiring and transferring the stock,
and in doing that he did not occupy a position of trust with relation to the company
of which he was president." Id. at 523, 111 Ati. at 23. The court was doubtless
motivated by the presumption that corporate recovery was necessary, and that thereby
the purchaser would receive 19/20 of the damages. Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621,
642, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221, 239-40 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (citing Keely). Other courts have also
taken the position that establishment of a fiduciary relation depends upon the capacity
in which defendant acted. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 216,
38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 525 (1942); Benson v. Braun, 141 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mere., 286 App. Div. 1098, 145 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1955).
Perhaps the short answer to this problem is that "the contention that a controlling
shareholder is entitled to sell his shares for anything he can get-provided only that
he himself has studiously avoided becoming a director or officer-cannot commend
itself to any system of justice." 1 Hornstein, op. cit. supra note 9, at 481; cf. 305 F.2d
at 575 n.3. Nor can the distinction based on the capacity in which the defendant acted
so commend itself. See Leech, supra at 776 & n.140.
54 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31.725

telling Transamerica that it should deal directly with minority shareholders. Transamerica purchased the stock of the minority at $220.00
per share, and stibsequently concluded the purchase from the defendant.
The court sustained the transaction on the ground that no fiduciary
relationship of the majority and minority existed, and for that reason
the majority had neither a duty to seek equal prices nor to apprise
minority shareholders of Transamerica's prior offer.55 The principle of
Tryon would surely encompass and uphold a transaction in which the
purchaser had previously made an offer for all or substantially all the
outstanding shares, but instead purchased only the control block at a
premium.
To examine the existence of possible detriment in these prior offer
cases, assume, first, that the purchaser made a prior offer to the corporation for all the outstanding shares or assets, but bought only controlling
shares and that the evidence showed conclusively that the purchaser
did not intend to sell the assets to himself, or to buy any more shares.
Should the seller be liable for any premium in this situation?
Aside from the argument of Professor Jennings that the sale at a
premium would raise a presumption of harm, 56 which is rebutted by the
evidence in the hypothetical case, it is difficult to see any basis for liability.
The remaining shareholders could argue that the purchase of control
achieved the same result as could have been achieved by a merger or
purchase of assets, namely an investment by the purchaser in the business.
Either merger or purchase would have resulted in equal treatment for all
shareholders. The argument would conclude that the seller, by use of
his position, changed the form so as to divert to himself a portion of
the recovery that would have inured to all the shareholders. A rule of
seller's liability based on the diversion argument is undesirable for two
reasons. First, a merger or sale of assets would not have occurred without
the payment of the premium price to the seller of control. The seller
would not consent to either of these forms unless he received the same
price as that at which he sold the controlling shares. And, presumably,
the purchaser could not afford to pay the higher price to all the shareholders. Indeed, because sale of assets or merger would be blocked by
the higher price the seller required, the remaining shareholders derive
a benefit from the sale of the controlling shares resulting from the prob57
ability of more efficient management by the purchaser. Second, there
are obvious difficulties in defining the situation in which liability for
the premium is to be imposed.
Id. at 180, 229 P2d at 254.
56 Jennings, supra note 52, at 16-19.
57 See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
55
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[-hen there is a buyer seeking either all of the shares of a
"corporate transaction" such as a merger or asset purchase...
the argument for "equality" is at its strongest since equality
would be the rule in case of a "corporate transaction." ... But
how is one to define the situation in which the restriction is to
apply?... Will the presence of any such proposal ... bring the
restraint into operation? Or must it be an offer on terms which
are later found to be "adequate?" 5 8
As a second hypothetical, assume that after the prior offer for all the
assets or outstanding shares, the purchaser bought only controlling shares
at a premium and the evidence showed a substantial risk or a certainty
that the purchaser would sell the assets to himself. The argument that
the selling controlling shareholder has diverted a portion of the corporation's assets to himself depends on the following reasoning: The prior
offer indicates that the purchaser has only a limited amount of capital
with which to acquire all the assets.5 9 When he buys controlling shares
at a premium he will necessarily have to pay less on a pro rata basis
to the remaining shareholders.6 0 The argument assumes, however, that
the purchaser's limited amount of capital per share will approximate
the market value of non-controlling shares. To base this assumption on
the existence of a prior offer of even infinitesimal size appears unrealistic.
The transaction can more easily be interpreted as indicating a desire of
the purchaser to expedite the purchase of the remaining interests at the
same price. This is so because it is more consonant with the existence
of a competitive market in share interests in corporations to assume that
the value per share of one hundred per cent interests in corporations
equals the per share value of controlling interests, than it does noncontrolling interests. It is evident, therefore, that where the purchaser
intends to purchase all the assets from the corporation, the existence
of the premium and the prior offer in themselves are insufficient to
indicate the probability of detriment. Liability of the seller should
instead depend on the foreseeability that the purchaser will pay a lower
pro rata price to the remaining shareholders on a purchase of the assets.
The existence of the prior offer may be relevant where the purchaser's
plans to acquire control of all the assets do not appear. It may be argued
that the prior offer itself indicates a substantial risk of a purchase of
58 Katz, supra note 9, at 380, 385.

59 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
60 Cf. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 At. 428 (1914), where the purchaser bought
all the outstanding shares in one transaction for an equal price, and then paid an
additional $115,000 to the defendants on passage of control of the board by a seriatim
resignation. The court predicated liability on the theory of sale of office. Id. at 437,
91 Atl. at 431-32.
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all the assets or stock at a price less than that paid the controlling shareholder. But in terms of the foreseeability test of Essex, substantial risk
is a question of fact dependent upon other factors, such as whether the
purchaser could have used the assets for an already existing business
and the ability of the purchaser to pay for later purchase of the assets.
To minimize the possibility that the purchaser will sell the assets to
himself or deal unfavorably for the remaining shares, disclosure of the
prior offer to all shareholders by those in control is desirable. 61 It might
be argued that disclosure has no effect, whether remaining shareholders
wish to sell or not, because the purchaser can always sell the assets to
himself at a lower price. Where, however, shareholder approval of the
sale of assets is required 2 and the controlling block does not suffice for
such approval, disclosure of the prior offer may cause the remaining
shareholders to vote against the sale. Furthermore, disclosure may enlarge
the possibilities of litigation about the price received for the sale of
assets, and dissuade the purchaser. Disclosure may also serve to forestall
acquisition of more shares by the controlling shareholders, as in Seltzer.63
The duty to disclose should arise at the date of the offer for assets or
all the stock, since the purchaser or controlling shareholder may buy
minority shares before the controlling interest is transferred, as in Tryon
v. Smith. A California opinion, Low v. Wheeler,64 imposed a duty to
disclose even though the defendant, a controlling shareholder, had not
sold his shares to the purchaser until after the plaintiff had sold his.
The court, however, in imposing liability for the premium on the
defendant, 65 confined the rule to cases of small numbers of shareholders,
61 Leech, supra note 53, at 801.
62 ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.72c (1961) (requirement of 2/3 vote); ABA-ALI

MODEL

Bus. CORP. AcT § 72 (1953).
65 If liability is imposed on the selling shareholder to protect against nondisclosure
by the purchaser or by the controlling shareholder when buying shares of the minority,
to the extent that the premium is recovered by the corporation or remaining shareholders the parties sought to be protected are not compensated. Perhaps if compensation of selling shareholders were the sole reason for disclosure, liability for the premium
should not be imposed, and defrauded minority shareholders should be left to their
common law and statutory remedies. See generally Comment, Insider Liability Under
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CMt. L. REv.
121 (1962).
64 24 Cal. Reptr. 538 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
65 See also Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 173 F.2d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1949), where the court held that an allegation "that
the majority stockholders and three key directors wilfully and in pursuance of a conspiracy withheld vitally important information [an offer to purchase the hotel, the
major asset of the corporation] from their associates on the Board of Directors and
from the stockholders at large" stated a cause of action. It was "information . . . to
which they were entitled under every rule of law and equity." Ibid. Quaere: Were the
shareholders, directors, or both entitled to the information? Cf. Ingraham v. National
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where the purchaser desires immediate purchase of the minority and
where an offer to purchase assets is involved. 66
But in the area of detrimental sales, protection will be afforded not
by disclosure but by liability of the seller in spite of disclosure of offers.
The proper test of liability of the selling shareholder is the reasonable
foreseeability that the sale will result in economic detriment to the
remaining shareholders. 67
B. Damages
Contemporary doctrine envisages recovery of the premium by remaining shareholders in cases of detrimental sales of controlling shares. Underlying the choice of the premium as the measure of damages are the
complementary goals of deterring the seller's conduct by depriving him
of the control premium and of compensating the injured shareholders.
The rationale justifying recovery of the premium in order to compensate
the injured shareholders assumes that the premium approximates the
actual damages. Surely a purchaser who is planning to loot the corporation of all its assets could afford to pay more for controlling shares than
the market value of non-controlling shares. But if perfect competition
exists in the market for controlling interests, he would be irrational in
offering to pay more for a controlling interest than the competitive price
for such interests. Should the seller attempt to charge more, the purchaser
would simply buy a different controlling interest. If the seller has knowledge that the purchaser is planning to loot the corporation, he will not
sell to the looter at the competitive price. Possibilities of liability and
the loss of prestige in the business community resulting from sale to a
looter result in higher costs in selling to looters. The seller may be able
to increase the price by these costs so long as the looting purchaser cannot
find sellers who are unaware of his plans. It cannot be supposed that
sellers who are unaware of the purchaser's plans would resist selling to
him at the competitive price for controlling interests, plus one dollar,
because they are unaware of the higher costs. In all probability, then,
the price paid by a wrongful purchaser of controlling interests will be
equal to the competitive price for such interests. One would expect that
Salt Co., 36 Misc. 646, 647-48, 74 N.Y. Supp. 388 (Sup. Ct. 1902) (moral if not legal
duty of officers to disclose offer to purchase majority of stock).
66 Low v. Wheeler, 24 Cal. Reptr. 588, 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962): "[I]n general,
majority stockholders need not tell minority stockholders of negotiations for sale of
stock ....
Sale of shares would not necessarily produce, as would sale of assets, a
pro rata distribution."
67 Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. Rv. 986, 1025 (1957), suggests
that the burden of going forward with evidence of foreseeable detriment should be
on the remaining shareholders, but that the seller has the burden of persuasion.
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wrongful purchasers would converge on sellers who, because of their
negligent lack of investigation of motives, are indifferent to the higher
costs in dealing with such purchasers. It is unlikely that the price paid
by looting purchasers to unknowing sellers will diverge from the competitive price for controlling interests-because of the convergence of
looters on unknowing sellers-and thus approximate the price that would
be charged looters by knowing sellers. This result is unlikely because
it not only presumes a relatively small number of negligent sellers but
also because it presumes that a great percentage of all purchases of
controlling interests are wrongful. This latter assumption, though consistent with the views of Professor Jennings, lacks empirical support.
Because wrongful purchasers do not constitute an overwhelming portion
of the demand for controlling interests, any convergence by them on
unknowing sellers tending to raise the price above the competitive price
for controlling interests will simply cause purchasers who do not have
wrongful motives to buy from non-negligent sellers and drive the price
back to the competitive price. In sum, the only justification for imposing
liability for the premium is to deter negligent sellers by imposing liability
for a figure which is in no way related to the wrongdoing.
The major difficulty with using the premium as the measure of the
negligent seller's liability is the lack of relation between the premium
and actual damages. Suppose that the seller of control has been negligent,
has not received a premium and the purchaser has looted the corporation. Is the seller to be excused from liability because of the absence of
a premium? The seller should not be excused, because he was negligent
and thereby caused injury to the remaining shareholders. The existence
or non-existence of the premium is meaningless. Actual damages were
assessed against the seller in the looting cases. 68 It is submitted that
actual damages are always the appropriate quantum of recovery. 6 Imposition of actual damages can be expected to act as a deterrent, and also
to properly compensate the injured shareholders. The court in Gerdes V.
Reynolds,7o however, awarded not only actual damages but also the
premium received by the seller. Such double recovery would seem improper except as a punitive sanction where the seller's actions are flagrant
or fraudulent. 7'
68 Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See
also Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 91, 208 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1948).
Plaintiffs frequently request actual damages. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265
App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942) (illegal profits and losses of the corporation);
cf. Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157 (1901) (premium and losses suffered by the
corporation).
69 Comment, 22 U. Cm. L. R.v. 895, 902 (1955).
70 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); supra note 28.
71 Note, 68 HAIv. L. REv. 1274, 1276 (1955).
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As a second example of lack of relation between the premium and
actual damages, assume that the seller received a premium in a situation
where a substantial risk of foreseeable detriment existed. Also assume
that the remaining shareholders bring their derivative suit against the
seller before actual damages have occurred, or that the corporation has
prospered under the skillful management of the purchaser. In this case,
imposition of liability on the seller would strain the foundations of the
tort theory on which recovery should be based. Because the standard of
liability should be one of negligence, in the absence of actual damages
one finds it difficult in the law of torts to find a basis for recovery beyond
a nominal amount.72 And analysis of the traditional rules of prophylaxis
in the law of corporations and trusts does not disclose any situations
where liability is imposed by the judiciary in the absence of actual or
presumed damages. When a director or officer is held liable for the appropriation of a corporate opportunity, 73 recovery, measured by the defendant's profits or the value of the asset, is of actual damages. The
amount recovered is simply the best measure of the profits the corporation would have made.74 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 75 the only prophylactic remedy in corporation law that imposes
liability in absence of damages, does so because of a legislative determination that it is impossible to acquire information about the many
permutations of insider wrongdoing. Furthermore, it is presumed that of
the transactions deterred, a significant proportion arise from the misuse of
inside information. 6 In the law of trusts, when a breach of trust has
&

TORTS 23 (1959) ("To be sure, actual damage is a
.'); 2 HARPER & JAmEs, ToRTS
1299-1300 (1956) (Damages in Accident Cases): "The cardinal principal of damages...
is that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of
duty. There are other traditional strains. Where the injury is intended . . . punitive
damages are sometimes allowed."
73 See, e.g., Irving Trust v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (Swan, J.), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 708 (1935); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
74 But cf. Wooten v. Wooten, 159 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 835
(1947). The court in Wooten imposed liability on a trustee who had appropriated a
"trust opportunity," rejecting a defense that the same investment by the trust would
have been improper. See also Kaplan, Conflict of Interest in Corporations, CONFERENcE
ON CONFLIar OF INTERsT 34, 42-43 (U. Chi. Law School Conference Series No. 17, 1961),
which raises the possibility of multiple liability of an officer or director of several
corporations who has appropriated an opportunity which each could have claimed. If
multiple liability for profits is imposed, any resemblance to actual damages suffered
is minimal.
75 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958).
76 Kaplan, Wolf v. Weinstein: Another Chapter on Insider Trading, 1963 Sup. CT.
REv. 273, 301. Section 16(b) awards recovery to the corporation of short-swing profits
of insiders. It does not compensate those who are presumably injured in their share
transactions with insiders. See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who
72 GREGORY

KALvEN, CASES ON

necessary part of a cause of action based on negligence. ..
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occurred, the remedy of a beneficiary to recover the profits of the trustee
resulting from the breach 77 is properly viewed as the best measure of the
profits that would have accrued to the trust estate in the absence of
breach.
It may be argued that, nevertheless, liability should be imposed on
the seller in the absence of actual damages for the following reasons:
First, an injunction will normally not be available because the sale will
already have been consummated.78 Even if available, it will probably be
denied because of the speculative nature of the injuries.7 9 Second, the
seller should not be excused, because it is probable that the detriment
will arise, or has already occurred, in subtle form, such as overpayment
of salaries. Thus the existence of actual damages should be presumed
because of the inadequacy of judicial scrutiny of officer's salaries.8 0 This
basis for imposing liability in the absence of actual damages, while it
properly indicates the inadequacies of present corporation law, is undesirable. As has been shown, the premium bears no relation to the amount
of actual damages, and unlike the defendant's profits in cases of the
appropriation of a corporate opportunity or a breach of trust,81 the
presumption of equivalence cannot be indulged. The proper solution is
closer judicial attention to the question of actual damages. 82
In light of the propriety of a requirement of actual damages, the
decision in Perlman v. Feldmann must surely fall. The plaintiff's theory
PurchaseShares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 64 (1960) ("One must conclude that the corporate
title to the special knowledge within the firm and the basic trust relations of insiders
to their firm create fiduciary duties to the corporation in this situation, not to the
selling shareholders.").
77 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 205 (1956); cf. Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169
N.E. 610 (1930) (recovery of employee's profits from a breach of duty of loyalty).
78 But see text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
79 Schwamm v. Alpert, 31 Misc. 2d 768, 221 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Francis v.
Medill, 16 Del. Ch. 129, 141 Atl. 697 (1928); Phelan v. Edison Elec. Illum. Co., 24 Misc.
109, 53 N.Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1898); cf. Ingraham v. National Salt Co., 36 Misc. 646,
74 N.Y. Supp. 388 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
80 See, e.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Rogers v. Hill, 289
U.S. 582 (1933); text accompanying notes 119 infra.
81 In Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940),
the court found reasonable foreseeability of detriment in a looting case and there was
no premium paid to the seller of control.
82 Cf. Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955). Patton was a suit by
a minority shareholder for liquidation on the ground of malicious suppression of
dividends. The Texas Supreme Court denied liquidation, and required a decree on
remand providing for a reasonable dividend at the earliest practical date plus retention
of jurisdiction over the corporation by the court for the protection of the plaintiff.
Id. at 398-99, 279 S.W.2d at 858. A retention of jurisdiction over the corporation when
a reasonable possibility of detriment has been shown but damages have not yet
occurred is an interesting possibility.
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did not stand on proof of actual damages and the trial court made a
specific finding that no actual damages to the corporation had resulted
from the control of the purchasers 3
The second major difficulty in the area of damages is the possibility
of double recovery.8 4 Suppose that the corporation or the remaining
shareholders in a looting case, after recovering actual damages from the
seller, sue the looters. Can the looters successfully plead satisfaction? The
possibility of unjustly enriching the shareholders is obvious whether
recovery from the seller is by the corporation, or, as in Perlman, by the
remaining shareholders directly. Direct recovery was allowed in Perlman
to avoid unjustly enriching the purchaser.8 5
The proper solution is to allow a suit by the seller to recover his
entire liability from the purchaser, who is after all more culpable. This
rule of indemnity would comport with the modem law of contribution
applicable to joint tortfeasors and co-trustees.8 6 Full compensation for
the injured shareholders will result, without the undesirable effects of
double recovery or of freeing the wrongdoing purchaser from liability.
It cannot be contended that the seller will be unjustly enriched by his
indemnity for actual damages.87 For although after indemnity of actual
damages he will have retained all the benefits of a sale at a premium,
83 "Since the Wilport nominees took over ...
substantial improvements have been
made in Newport's property and the corporation has enjoyed continued prosperity.
Although the Wilport stockholders have purchased substantial quantities of steel from
Newport, no sales were made at less than Newport's quoted mill prices. There is no
evidence of any sort that Newport has suffered from mismanagement or inefficient
management . . . or that it has suffered or is likely hereafter to suffer any harm
whatever at the hands of its new management, or that its new management has in
any way failed to do anything which should have been done for the good of the
corporation." 129 F. Supp. at 175-76.
84 Cf. Francis v. Medill, 16 -Del. Ch. 129, 133-34, 141 Atd. 697, 699 (1928) (recovery
can always be had from the purchaser).
85 Allowing recovery directly to the remaining shareholders to avoid unjustly
enriching the purchaser is eminently proper. Where the corporation has been
completely looted of its assets, corporate recovery should be granted to the extent
necessary for the protection of corporate creditors. Note, Disregard of the Corporate
Entity for the Benefit of Shareholders, 1963 DuKE L.J. 722, 728-30. See also Note,
Shareholders' Right to Direct Recovery in Derivative Suits, 17 Wyo. L.J. 208 (1963).
86 1 HA Zw& JAMFs, ToaRs § 102 (1956); 3 ScoTr, TRusrs § 258 (1956): "Ordinarily
anyone of the trustees who makes good the breach of trust is entitled to contribution
from the other trustees ....
There are, however, three limitations on the rule as to
contribution: (1) where one of the trustees is substantially more at fault than the
others; (2) where one of the trustees profits from the breach of trust; (3) where the
breach of trust is committed in bad faith." Because the premium is not attributable to
the wrongdoing of the purchaser, the seller cannot be considered to have profited from
the transaction. Thus, he should not be denied recovery by the second exception to
contribution stated by Scott.

87

See text at Part B supra.
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the sale price was in no way inflated by the risk of wrongdoing. The
seller received no more than the competitive price for corporate controlling shares. The only objection that can be made to a rule of indemnity
in favor of the negligent seller of controlling shares is that he will not
be deterred from making the sale. The possibility of indemnity, it is
submitted, would do little to minimize the deterrent effect of the risk
of seller's liability. Where looting is foreseeable, no reasonable seller
would expect to be able to subsequently locate the looter. And if indemnity is allowed to the seller where the actual damages are the entire
value of the corporation, it would be an anomaly to deny indemnity in
cases of less detriment.
The seller should therefore be liable only for actual damages attributable to the foreseeable conduct of the purchaser and should be allowed
complete indemnity from the purchaser for his liability.8 8 Recovery of
actual damages by the remaining shareholders from the seller should
bar any action by the remaining shareholders against the purchaser, in
order to obviate double recovery.89
C. Seriatim Resignations
Although the prior New York case law had held that a bargained-for
acceleration of board control was improper and "incidental" transfer of
88 Although the instances in which courts have imposed liability for the premium
on wrongdoing sellers are not many, it is perhaps too much to expect that at this date
the courts will depart from the assumption of most commentators that it is the
appropriate remedy. Calculation of the premium may be a difficult undertaking. The
premium is properly defined as price paid for controlling shares less investment value.
Leach, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, at 818 (1956). The
Second Circuit in Perlman stated that damages were to be the sales price for the controlling shares less the value of the appurtenant power to control the corporate product.
219 F.2d at 178. This approach, implying that the price paid varies with the amount of
detriment, should be rejected. Normally, investment value is equal to market value on
an exchange. But where market value is unrealistic because of management dealings,
as in the Perlman remand, the investment value of the seller's stock may be determined by its pro rata share of enterprise value. Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp.
436, 451 (D. Conn. 1957); BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937), quoted in
BLUM, MATERIALS ON INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATION 231-32 (1960).

See also Eastern

Gas & Fuel Associates, 30 S.E.C. 834 (1950).
In the Perlman remand, the court committed itself to the use of enterprise value
at the date of the sale, yet allowed the parties at their urging to introduce evidence
of events subsequent to the date of sale on the issue of value. 154 F. Supp. at 447-48.
This result involves double counting. If the foreseen detriment has materialized, it
may have reduced enterprise value below that at the date of the sale.
If the seller were liable in every case for the premium, the seller could properly
contend that in the absence of a market value he had no guidance as to the proper
sales price and that therefore he should not be liable for a premium calculated by
the enterprise value technique.
89 Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 421-22 (1937).
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board control was legal, 90 Essex rejected this distinction and held that,
absent a showing of probable detriment to the corporation, a clause
providing for seriatim resignations in a contract to sell working share
control was not per se illegal. 91
The doctrine that bargained-for transfers of control of management
are illegal proceeds from the notion that control is a corporate asset-a
power to be used for the benefit of all shareholders. 92 The reasoning is
that those in control should not limit their discretion or exercise it for
their own benefit. Analogies are abundant. Contracts to cause directors
to resign are illegal, 93 as are contracts among shareholder-directors to
choose and perpetuate management, 94 and contracts to sterilize the
board.95 Similarly a trustee may not receive payment for surrender of
his position to another.96 This rule has been properly applied in cases
of mutual insurance company officials selling their offices.927 A final
analogy is to the corporate electoral process, where, because of principles
of corporate democracy, the shareholder cannot sell his vote.98
90 Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, 71, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1956); San
Remo Copper Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 149 App. Div. 26, 28 (1912).
91 "A matter so practically important as achievivg immediate rather than deferred
acquisition of control over the day-to-day operations of the corporation in which
Essex was making such a substantial investment cannot be dismissed as a mere
'incidental provision.'" 305 F.2d at 574.
92 Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1217, 1219 (1958).
93 Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (1880), involved the illegality of a contract
between a director, who held the deciding vote in an equal split between two factions,
and one of the factions. The director agreed to resign and aid that faction in electing
a successor of its choosing.
94 McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Van Slyke v. Andrews,
146 Minn. 316, 178 N.W. 959 (1920). McQuade was overruled by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 620(b) (1961), which allows limitations on the discretion of management, providing
all incorporators agree.
95 Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). The result in Manson has
been overruled by statute. See note 94 supra.
96 Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Giff. 192, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch. 1856); cf. RETATEmENr, TRusTs §§ 106, 203, 205 (1935) (resignation and liability of trustee); 2 Scorr,
TRuSTs § 171.1 (1956) (liability for delegation of entire administration).
97 Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Fed. 607 (N.D. Ill. 1908), aff'd sub noma.
Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910); McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E.
388 (1899) (probably a mutual company-no share transfers involved in the case);
cf. Heineman v. Marshall, 117 Mo. App. 546, 92 S.V. 1131 (1905). An English case
standing for the same proposition served as the precursor of statutes which prohibit
payments made to directors as compensation for loss of office or in connection with
retirement unless disclosed to and ratified by the shareholders at a general meeting.
Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav. 360, 53 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1858); Companies Act of
1948, 11 &c12.Geo. VI, c. 38, §§ 192-94; GowER, THE PmNCipLts OF MODERN COMPANY
LAw 489-92 (2d ed. 1957).
98 See and compare 1 HoRNs'TIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACrICE, 212 (illegal sales
of votes by shareholders).
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In spite of the persuasiveness of these arguments, they are inapposite
when share control is transferred. When the seller ceases to have control
of the corporation it is preferable that he and his representatives resign
from the board and be replaced by the purchaser, who does have a
monetary stake. 99 Further, if the purchaser acquires controlling stock,
there is nothing to prevent him from electing his own board at the next
election.' 00 These factors, in addition to the economic argument that
purchasers might be discouraged if they had to assume the risk of mismanagement at the hands of the seller and his representatives' 0' after
the sale, are decisive in favor of permitting transfer of a board by seriatim
resignation to the purchaser. 0 2
The proper rule would be to allow a provision for seriatim resignations in a contract for a sale of controlling shares.' 03 If, however, the
99 Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 527, 537 (1880).
100 305 F.2d at 575. A complication with this assertion is suggested by the facts of
Essex, where the by-laws of the corporation provided for staggered election of the
board of directors. It can be contended that statutes permitting the staggering of
elections of board members reflect approbation of continuity of management and
disfavor of too rapid change, and that therefore the manner of change provided for
in the by-laws should be respected. Compare Investment Co. Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 813
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a(16)(a) (1958) (limiting seriatim resignation in investment companies to one-third of the board). The failure of the court in Essex to discuss this issue
may stem from a general view that the purpose of staggering is to circumvent the requirement of cumulative voting. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701
(1955); Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956). To disallow
seriatim resignation where the by-laws provide for staggering would serve to further
discourage sales of control, in that the risks attendant on purchase by allowing the
seller to control would be greatly magnified.
101 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1962).
102 Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 933 (1962). But see Note, 4 BoSToN COLLEGE
INDUSTIAL - COMMERCIAL L. REV. 421, 422-25 (1962); Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 786, 789-91
(1955). See also Hill, The Sale of ControllingShares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986, at 994, 1006
(1957); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 807-08 (1956),
to the effect that a clause for seriatim resignation is generally irrelevant on the issue
of whether a reasonable foreseeability of detriment existed.
103 Cf. SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958). But cf. Krieger v.
Anderson, 173 A.2d 626 (Del. Ch. 1961), motion for reargument denied, 177 A.2d 203,
afJ'd, 182 A.2d 907 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962). These cases involved sales at an alleged
premium for control of companies that were investment advisers to mutual funds. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 provides for automatic termination of a management
contract with the fund when the adviser's controlling shares are transferred. The Act
requires a vote of the fund's shareholders to reinstate the contract. Investment
Company Act of 1940 §§ 2(a)(4), 15(a)(4), 15(b)(2), 54 Stat. 791, 812, 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-2(a)(4), 80a-15(a)(4), 80a-15(b)(2) (1963). Krieger stated that sellers of controlling
shares of the advisers who were also directors of the fund were liable for the excess over
fair value, on the theory that they improperly used their positions as directors of the
fund to insure reinstatement of the contract by use of the fund's proxy machinery.
173 A.2d at 634. But the seller was entitled to the premium attributable to "the good
will element of value arising . . . from the expectancy of renewal of the service
contracts, at least in the hands of the sellers." Id. at 633. See also Note, Mutual Funds
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shares do not carry voting control, the seller should be liable for the
premium,10 4 because the premium is just a payment for seriatim resignations. If there is no premium, seriatim resignations should be considered
proper. When the directors negligently transfer board control to someone
who harms the corporation, they should be liable for the actual damages
whether or not they received any consideration.
Because the owner of shares that do not carry voting control cannot
sell them for a premium and contract to provide seriatim resignations,
neither should he be allowed to grant an option to purchase the shares
for a consideration and also provide for immediate seriatim resignations.' 05 The value of the option, because of the probabilities in variation
in value of the stock, is indeterminate. For this reason it is difficult to
detect what portion of the consideration is attributable to the option
and what is attributable to the payment for immediate board control.
Since the seller is liable for the premium on the sale of non-controlling
shares coupled with a provision for seriatim resignations, the definition
of "control" is crucial. Chief Judge Lumbard in Essex stated that the
propriety of the provision for seriatim resignation depended upon
whether the 28.3% of the outstanding shares could elect a majority of
the directors at the next shareholder's meeting, assuming neutral proxy
machinery. Of course the neutral proxy machinery restriction on the
"working control" standard is correct; otherwise, for large, publicly held
corporations 06 working control would be held by management regardless
of share ownership, thus justifying naked sales of offices.
Although the neutral proxy machinery requirement shifts the definition of working control from shareholder-director relationships 07 to
the relations of shareholders inter sese, there are obvious difficulties in
administering a test based on the latter. Judge Friendly in his concurring
opinion in Essex stated that were he on the New York Court of Appeals,
he would sanction sales accompanied by a seriatim resignation only where
and the Investment Advisory Contract, 50 VA. L. REv. 141, 149-54 (1964). This case is
analogous to the situation where there is a payment to directors of the fund for
transfer of offices in the fund without an underlying transaction in the stock of the
fund. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
104 See note 88 supra for a definition of the premium.
105 For an example of seriatim resignations with an option to purchase the seller's
shares, see In re Caplan's Petition, 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964). The
trial court blocked voting by the directors who had been installed by the assignee of the
optionee on a proposed acquisition of other companies controlled by the assignee. The
Appellate Division affirmed and vacated the seriatim resignations on the ground that
control (8%) was not involved. Id. at 803, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (1964).
106 Hill, The Sale of ControllingShares, 70 HAsv. L. REv. 986, 998 (1957).
107 See BrauE, PowER grmsour PROPERTY 71 (Harvest ed. 1959).
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more than fifty per cent of the shares were sold. However, he advised
purchasers of less than fifty per cent interests that they could always
require that the sale be contingent upon an election of their nominees
for the board at a special meeting of the shareholders. 08 It is not clear
whether he would require neutral proxy machinery at such a special
meeting. To him the Lumbard test is unduly complex, requiring consideration of such factors as the proportion of shares held in street names,
personality factors, 109 dividend policies and possible stockholder disenchantment.110 The problems raised by Judge Friendly are substantial,
and a formula for determining when shares alone carry control does not
admit of easy or mathematical articulation."'1 It is probable, however,
that in the mine run of cases these problems will not occur and that
judges can quickly and easily decide the particular question."12 The
Lumbard rule would minimize the risks imposed on the purchaser while
management controlled by the seller remains entrenched, and would
eliminate the necessity of costly notification of shareholders for a special
election of directors at the purchaser's expense. The expectation that
looting would be minimized by the Friendly approach seems of little
merit if the purchaser can later elect directors in any case. The rule in
detrimental sale cases would seem to afford sufficient protection from
1 3
looting. 1
II.

PREMIUM FOR CONTROL IN RECAPITALIZATIONS

In a corporate recapitalization wherein a single class of common stock
replaces two classes which are identical except that only one has voting
rights, the principal problem is whether a premium for control should
108 305 F.2d at 581.
"
109
'Working control' is . . . complex because it involves an additional element
which is in fact a quasi-political process. This element is the capacity to mobilize other
shareholders." Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law," 58 COLUm. L. REy. 1212, 1213
(1958).
110 305 F.2d at 582.
Ill But see Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)-(9), 54 Stat. 791-92 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)-(9) (1963) (rebuttable presumption that 25% carries control).
112 Any judicial standard that serves to resolve the easy cases can of course be
criticized as fantasy. In light of the fact that a major function of corporation law is
guidance, the purchasers in the "easy cases" should be encouraged to acquire board
control by seriatim resignations to eliminate the expense of a neutral special election.
The difficulties of indicating the outcome with neutral proxy machinery, especially
when the burden of showing that the shares carried control, is properly placed on the
purchaser. Note, Corporations:Sale of Control, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 295, 298-99 (1964),
would channel other proposed sales to the procedure suggested by Judge Friendlythat of making sale contingent upon election of the purchaser's nominees at a special
meeting of the shareholders.
113 Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 933, 942-43 (1962).
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be allowed to the voting shares. A related problem is whether a seller
of the voting and, by definition, the controlling shares should be allowed
to retain the premium.
Suppose first that the owner of the controlling voting shares sells them
to a third party at a premium. When the voting shares are very few in relation to all common shares the transaction appears to be, in essence, a
mere barter of corporate office. But there are obvious difficulties in articulating the basis and limits of a rule imposing liability for the premium on
the seller of voting shares. If liability depends on whether the voting shares
would constitute working control 'if the non-voting shares had voting
rights, the basis of liability must be that the owner of the controlling
voting shares does not have a sufficiently large monetary stake in relation
to other investors in the company. If lack of monetary stake is indeed
the criterion, there is a difficulty in distinguishing an ordinary sale of
controlling shares for a premium and seriatim resignations when the
corporation is highly leveraged with debt and preferred shares (which
is proper in the absence of foreseeable detriment). Aside from the fact
that practical considerations in the capital market limit the degree of
leverage but not the percentage of non-voting shares, the risk of wrongdoing and the possibilities of benefits from sale to efficient management
are equally great in both cases. Unless the law is to revert to a rule of
liability without standards such as "barter of corporate offices" the
premium should not be recoverable from the seller of controlling voting
shares.
The Eighth Circuit in Honigman v. Green Giant Co. 114 allowed a
premium to the voting shares in a recapitalization."15 The defendant
corporation had two classes of common stock outstanding: 44 shares of
class A, and 428,998 shares of class B. The shares were identical in all
respects, except that only class A shares had voting rights. A plan of
recapitalization, approved by 92.3 per cent of the class B shareholders,
created only one class of common stock and increased the participation
of the class A in the equity from 0.01 per cent to 9.3 per cent. The
plaintiff, a class B shareholder, brought a class action to upset the
plan. The court, limited to Minnesota law by its diversity jurisdiction,
completely rejected the view of Professor Berle that a premium for control is a corporate asset, 116 and upheld the plan on the ground "that
no fraud or inequitable conduct was resorted to in consummating the
114

309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).

115 Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1960), is a case with facts and

outcome substantially similar to Honigman.
116

309 F.2d at 670.
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amendment, 117 and the proposed plan was fair, equitable" 8 and beneficial
both to the non-voting class B stockholders and to the corporation."" 1 9
In a recapitalization, as in the cases of prior offers for the purchase
of all the assets 120 and in reorganizations 12' the argument for equal treatment of shareholders is a pleasing one. Equal treatment would appear
desirable if the only possibility of benefit to the corporation was improved management. The facts of Honigman would indicate that no such
changes were likely. The controlling owner of voting shares can properly
be considered to have owned twenty per cent of the class B shares and
122
hence, probably retained working control after the recapitalization.
Even if working control was not retained and the transaction charac123
it
terized an arms-length sale of control to the class B shareholders,
is doubtful that existing management would be supplanted by a vote
of the dispersed shareholders. 124 In publicly-held corporations, the shareholders seldom can control management. 12 5 But improved management
is not the only class of economic benefit possibly flowing from the transaction. "Without voting stock, listing on a major exchange was blocked,
117 Compare Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), aff'd,
146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148
(1943). The decision in Honigman cannot be said to rest on a judgment of the court
that an adequate remedy for the dissenting shareholder was provided by appraisal
rights. Such rights in Minnesota in the case of a charter amendment are limited to a
substantial change in corporate purposes or an extension of the duration of the
corporation. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301A0(1) (1947). Even where the appraisal remedy is
available, the protection it provides is doubtful. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 232-33 (1962).
118 Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 (1942); cf.
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939), which denied, in a
plan of reorganization, a claim for participation by common shareholders based on
"financial standing and influence" and "continuity of management." "Such items are
illustrative of a host of intangibles which, if recognized as adequate consideration for
the issuance of stock to valueless junior interests, would serve as easy evasions of the
principle of full or absolute priority ...
119 309 F.2d at 671-72.
120 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
121 See note 118 supra.
122 The trial court found the contrary. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp.
754, 765 (D. Minn. 1961). The plaintiff in Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741 (Del.
Ch. 1960), also argued that the class A retained working control, but the court
responded "that the A may fairly exact a premium as a condition to the relinquishment of absolute voting control." 165 A.2d at 754.
123 Cf. Manacher v. Reynolds, supra note 122, at 755.
124 Apparently the existing management desired the recapitalization in Honigman
to forestall "control falling into undesirable hands" on the death of the present
controlling shareholder of class A, by imposing a higher capital requirement on such
undesirables. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22, 45 n.67
(1963).
125 See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ. 1477 (1958).
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marketability hampered, and expansion opportunities, equity financing,
and diversification by merger and acquisition were made more difficult."126

Thus the economic rationale for allowing the premium in cases of
27
sales of control may be equally present in recapitalizations
Furthermore, if a premium is not allowed in recapitalizations, although
it is properly allowable in cases of sales of voting shares, the net effect
of the prohibition in recapitalizations will be to prevent their occurrence.
The controlling owner of voting shares will prefer to sell them, in which
case a premium is allowable. Prohibition of the premium in a recapitalization is a practical alternative only when the controlling shareholder
and management are under a fiduciary duty of establishing the optimal
capital structure, and are thus bound to propose a recapitalization. 128 A
rule of fiduciary duty to establish the best capital structure does not exist
at present, however, because of fears of judicial interference with management. The courts scrutinize the transactions in capital structure when
they occur. 129 Because there is a possibility that non-controlling and nonvoting shares may not have the protection of arms-length dealing, judicial
scrutiny for fraud and gross unfairness is desirable. 130
III. CONCLUSION
The reluctance of the judiciary to impose a general rule of liability on
sellers of controlling shares is basically sound. There is a strong possibility that a significantly large number of economically beneficial sales
of control would be blocked by a rule that the seller is liable in all
cases. Ipse dixit aside, the burden of establishing that a large proportion
of purchasers are actuated by improper motives causing damages that
cannot be restored by the imposition of liability on the purchaser has
not been met, nor has any empirical support been adduced. Sellers of
corporate control should be liable to the remaining shareholders only
when they have sold under circumstances indicating a reasonable probability of economic detriment, and actual damages have occurred. If a
recovery is made from the seller, he should be allowed an action over
against the purchaser to recover his liability.
Bayne, supra note 124, at 45.
See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
Bayne, supra note 124, at 49, would impose this fiduciary duty.
Cf. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 32 U.S.L. WxEK 2146 (Baltimore
Cir. Ct. May 16, 1963), noted in 112 U. PA. L. REv. 916 (1964). The court in United
Funds held that a controlling shareholder breached his fiduciary duty to the minority
by voting for a recapitalization of common stock into voting and non-voting shares,
causing the minority to lose the benefits of stock exchange listing.
130 See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), af'd, 146 F.2d
701 (3d Cir. 1944).
126
127
128
129

